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Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to examine the potential impact of oil revenues on the 
economy of Sudan and the challenges facing the Government in policy making, 
particularly trade policy and allocation of oil revenues for long-run development and 
diversification of the production and export structure of the economy. The exploitation of 
oil resources has been accompanied by impressive liberalization of the economy by the 
Government of Sudan. Since then the country has been integrating into the world 
economy rapidly based on oil revenues. Yet, little has been achieved so far in integrating 
various sectors of the domestic economy despite relatively rapid GDP growth based on 
oil revenues. Rapid economic growth and diversification of the economy are among the 
main objectives of the Government. Therefore, the challenge facing the Government is to 
design and implement a long-term development strategy in order to build up a solid 
industrial and agricultural sector for sustainable development and expansion of non-oil 
exports. In such a strategy the design, and implementation, of trade and industrial policies 
and the way oil revenues are allocated, takes, inter alia, importance.  
 Developing a conceptual framework of analysis, the author will argue that while 
export of petroleum provides financial resources for the acceleration of investment and 
growth, prospects for sustained growth and diversification will be still limited by some 
physical and institutional bottlenecks which can not be easily overcome by ample oil 
revenues. Trade in oil itself may have some detrimental socio-economic effects, 
including the attitude and policies of the Government, on the prospects for development 
and diversification of the economy in the long-run. Therefore, the Government policies, 
particularly trade policies, and the way oil revenues are allocated may not be necessarily 
conducive to long-run development and diversification of production and export 
structure. Proposing an alternative long-run trade and industrial policy for the country, 
the author will also outline the practical problems of its implementation under current 
international trade rules.  
---------- 
*The author is a development economist with D.Phil from Oxford Univsity. He is currently an international 
consultant affiliated to the Institute of Economic Research, University of Neuchatel, Switzerland. He is the 
former Head, Macroeconomic and Development Policies Branch, UNCTAD and the author of a large 
number of articles, published in international journals, on trade and industrial policies, economic reform 
and other development policy issues. His latest book is: Trade Policy at the Crossroads; the recent 
experience of developing countries, Macmillan, 2005. This paper is developed on the basis of a part of a 
study undertaken for the World Bank under a DTSI project financed by the same Organization. The author 
benefited from interviews with Government authorities and comments from Mr. P. Shuler to whom goes 
his thanks. Comments are welcome and can be sent to author: M.Shafaeddin@Gmail.com. 
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      Introduction 
The purpose of this study is to examine challenges facing Sudan as a low income country 
with the aspiration of rapid economic growth, diversification and improving the wellbeing 
of the population in a globalizing world economy. The country is privileged with the 
discovery of some petroleum resources, and it is attempting to undertake economic 
liberalization and to integrate into the world economy. How do oil revenues and their 
allocation by the Government will affect the prospects for fulfilling that aspiration? What is 
the role of other Government policies, particularly trade and industrial policies, in that 
respect? In this paper we will try to shed some light on these questions.  
 We will argue that an appropriate long-run trade policy takes more importance in 
Sudan than in many other developing countries because the exchange rate loses some of its 
usefulness as a policy tool due to the Dutch Disease. Nonetheless, trade policy will not be an 
effective policy tool on its own. A host of other physical and institutional factors as well as 
availability of skilled manpower etc. are also important which require appropriate 
Government policies. Trade in oil has positive effect on development but at the same time it 
may play an inimical role in the process of acceleration of growth and long-run development 
diversification of the economy. It may do so not only directly but also indirectly through its 
impact on the attitude and policies of the Government. In other words, export of petroleum 
provides financial resources for accelerating investment and growth. Nevertheless, 
prospects for sustained growth and diversification will be still limited by some physical 
and institutional bottlenecks which can not be overcome by trade easily. In fact, trade in 
oil itself may have some detrimental effects on the prospects for diversification of the 
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economy in the long-run: It renders the relative role of trade and policy in 
industrialization and development more important than in the absence of oil. Yet, trade 
policy will not be effective in achieving development objective without consideration, 
inter alia, of the inimical role which oil could play in the process of development, 
including its impact on the attitude of the Government and its policies on allocation of oil 
revenues. Further, international trade rules will restrict the policy space of the 
Government as the country is in the process of accession to WTO. 
 To proceed, we will first outline briefly the main characteristics of the economy of 
Sudan and the development objectives of the Government. Subsequently, we will provide an 
analytical framework for the study before analyzing the impact of oil and the role of 
Government. The trade policy of the country will be subject of a separate section followed 
by our proposal for alternative trade and industrial policies. In this section we will also 
discuss possibilities and practical problems of implementation of the proposed policies as 
the country accede to WTO. The final section concludes the study.  
 
I. Main characteristics of the Sudanese Economy and Government Objectives 
Sudan is a low-income and least developed country with a population of over 35 millions; it 
depends on production and exports of primary commodities; it still suffers from 
international sanctions and regional conflicts, which drag on its resources necessary for 
investment and development. The government has undertaken economic liberalization, 
particularly of its foreign trade regime, during the last 15 years. Furthermore, in recent years, 
it has become an oil exporting country. Availability of petroleum, together with trade 
liberalization, has allowed Sudan to begin integrating into the world economy rapidly. The 
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X/GDP and M/GDP ratios of the country have increased from 3 and 7 in 1995, to 15 and 19 
in 2003, respectively (UNCTAD,2005:table 7.3). The country will be going further into oil 
in its output and export structure. Although no accurate data on oil reserves are available, the 
probable reserves seems to be immense the life of which may be as long as 20 to over 60 
years1. 
While integrating into the world economy rapidly, the Sudanese economy shows little 
sign of integrating various sectors and regions of the domestic economy and provision of 
employment in the modern sector. The oil sector provides little prospects for employment 
directly. The unemployment rate is high and the need for employment creation is immense, 
particularly in the urban areas where the rate of population growth may exceed four per cent 
a year and the Manufacturing sector employs only a small number of the workforce.  
 
Government development objectives and strategy and its growth requirements 
The Comprehensive National Plan of 1992-2002 was drawn with a very clear vision and 
priorities. There has been interruption in the formulation and implementation of a 
development strategy because of the war. Nevertheless, some attempts have been made 
recently for formulating a 25 year development strategy by the Strategic Development 
Council. According to the Sudanese authorities, the long-run development planning is based 
on the vision/mission of attaining a status of a unified, secured, and civilized [modern] and 
advanced nation by 2031. While there will be sectoral objectives for which five year plans 
will be drawn based on Joint Assessment Mission (JAM), the overall strategic development 
objectives include, inter alia, to:  
• achieve sustained rapid growth and reduce poverty;  
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• to increase value added and to diversify the structure of output and export out of 
primary commodities;  
• to use trade as a means of development by integration of the Sudanese economy into 
the world economy through accession to WTO and joining other trade agreements.  
Although it is not sufficient, the acceleration of the pace of growth is a necessary and 
important condition to achieve the main objectives outlined above. For example, to reduce 
poverty by 50 per cent in 2015, the overall Sudanese GNP need to grow, on average, by 
about 10 per cent a year (JAM, 2005, Volume I: 32); a more conservative estimate requires 
an average growth rate of GDP of about 8 per cent for the whole country and 31 per cent for 
the South (table 1). As is shown in the same table, the I /GDP ratio is significant as 
compared with the actual ratio of about 17 percent in 1999-the fist year when oil was 
exported (see table 2). 
Insert table 1 here  
Growth of agriculture is regarded, by JAM, important for poverty reduction in rural 
areas and the Government is considering a programme of “rehabilitation” for this sector. 
Nevertheless, achieving a status of advanced economy also requires acceleration of growth 
of manufacturing and services sectors. In fact, according to the authorities of the Ministry of 
Industry, in the 2007-11 Plan, it is proposed that development of this sector should be given 
priority in order to accelerate its growth, to raise its share in GDP (implying its growth 
should exceed growth of GDP), to enhance value added in manufacturing exports and 
increase contribution of the sector to employment.  
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 While the government objective are divers, in this paper we will concentrate on the 
question of growth and diversification of the production and export structure as they are 
necessary conditions for long-run development of the country.   
 
II. Analytical framework: 
oil and acceleration of development2 
 
 
In order to accelerate the rate of growth of production capacity of the country, without an 
Inflationary pressure, and diversify the structure of production and exports, there will be a 
need, inter alia, for the acceleration of investment outlays. To do so, in the absence of oil, 
there is a need to raise the propensity to save, via taxing the well-to-do, or by other means, 
given the possibility of external financing. The possibility of raising the propensity to save 
will be, however limited in the absence of oil, due to the low level of per capita income. 
Nevertheless, even if the necessary funds for investment became more available by higher 
savings the capacity to invest would be limited, by “supply-determined” industries and 
factors such as the supply of physical resources, the supply of skilled human resources and 
by institutional and organizational factors.  
 Physical resources include infrastructure, capital goods, intermediate goods, raw 
materials, and consumer goods. Infrastructure is complementary to other resources. 
Consumer goods may be divided into necessities (basic needs), and non-essentials (luxury).  
The increase in investment raises the demand for necessities (including food) because of the 
rise in employment and income, particularly in urban areas. The supply of capital goods is 
limited mainly because of inflexibility in the production capacity of investment goods due to 
the scarcity of technological know-how.  The possibility of expansion of raw materials and 
 7 
some necessities, namely foods, is limited because they are among 'supply determined 
industries'.  Supply determined industries are those activities whose long-run rate of growth 
is limited by natural, technical and organisational and/or institutional barriers, "so that even 
a considerable increase in capital outlays will not help to raise their output at a high rate" 
(Kalecki, l955)3.  Food is supply determined mostly because of institutional obstacles to 
development of agriculture including the lack of finance, land ownership, technical services, 
agricultural infrastructure, and above all marketing facilities. Organizational factors are 
related to the scarcity of “decision making ability” of the bureaucratic machinery of the 
government and shortage of modern entrepreneurs.   
 Trade acts as a “joker” of growth by increasing the supply of goods and easing the 
inflationary pressure. Trade in oil, in particular, contributes to growth not only directly but 
also indirectly through its financial and “supply effects”. Oil revenues provide the means of 
financing investment thus allowing higher I/Y ratio without a need for substantial increase 
in taxes. Further they provide foreign exchange directly and indirectly through increases in 
the credit worthiness of the country in international financial markets and the expansion of 
FDI. The increase in the price of oil, thus the improvement in the terms of trade, is, in 
particular, advantageous. It accrues to the economy without sacrificing extra resource. 
Further, it does not involve repayments of debts, necessary in the case of foreign borrowing, 
or remittance of profits, in the case of FDI. Moreover, unlike grants there is no 
conditionality attached to it. 
 Through its “supply effects”, oil revenues increase the ceiling on the rate of growth 
of “supply determined” products and ease the inflationary pressure through enhancing the 
supply of wage goods by providing foreign exchange for imports. In other words, a 
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favourable growth in oil revenues will allow bridging of the gap between the rate of growth 
in the demand for necessities and industrial inputs, and the rate of growth of their domestic 
supply. Consequently higher rates of growth of industrial production and GDP should 
become attainable depending on the allocation of foreign exchange. 
 Nevertheless, the contribution of oil revenues to growth should not be exaggerated. 
First of all, the contribution of imports to growth of industrial capacity and non-oil GDP is 
limited. The higher the rate of growth in investment, the more rapidly does the demand for 
imports of capital goods, raw materials, and semi-manufactures increase. So does the 
demand for necessities. In other words, the marginal propensity to import is an increasing 
function of growth of GDP; it will tend to unity. For a given growth in export earnings it 
becomes progressively more difficult to increase imports of necessities (wage goods) 
because of growing demand for imports other than necessities. 
  Secondly, the acceleration of growth will be limited due to the inhibiting role of 
complementary factors, required for development, such as infrastructure, supply of non-
traded supply determined goods (e.g. utilities) and services, skilled labour, and 
organizational as well as institutional factors. 
 Thirdly, the oil boom has detrimental impact on the structure of incentives both in  
the public and in the private sectors (Seers 1964, 1969 and 1978) and develops “rentier” 
mentalities (Mahdavi, 1970, Beblawi and Luciani, 1987, Karl, 1997, Shafaeddin, 1980 and 
2003) and resource curse (Gelb, et. al (1988, Auty1993 and Ghosh and Berg, 2001). With 
respect to the Government, the problem is partly institutional related to the socio-political 
and economic impact of oil. Oil revenues accrue to the state and the way they are spent and 
channeled to the economy, in turn, affects the growth of productive activities. In theory, the 
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government machinery may choose to channel the oil revenues partly through the banking 
system, e.g. through development banks and partly directly. The vested interest of the 
bureaucratic institutions in all oil exporting countries has tilted in favour of using oil 
revenues for financing Government budget; and often current expenditures have increased 
much faster than development expenditures. In particular, the people in the government 
machinery tend to snatch on the “rent” by different means including increasing their own 
salaries.  
 Apart from the allocation of oil revenues between current and capital expenditures, 
the oil revenues affect the pattern of investment and production against the tradable sectors 
of the economy limiting prospects for the expansion of non-oil production and exports. The 
experience of oil exporting countries shows first of all that the ease of financial resources 
provided by oil reduces the need for attention to the agricultural sector and non-oil exports 
by the government. Moreover, the appreciation of the local currency, and the so-called 
Dutch disease (Corden, 1984, Davis,1995), changes the price structure in favour of non-
tradable goods and against tradable products, and within tradable as against non-oil exports. 
There are both "push" and "pull" factors in operation against tradables and in favoure of 
non-tradables. Normally, the export prices of agricultural products, and other primary 
commodities (except oil) are demand determined (unless a country is a large producer) and 
those of manufactured goods are cost determined. In other words, prices of agricultural 
products are determined in international market, thus a change in the cost of production can 
not change the international price of the product; and  for a given international price, the 
change (appreciation) in exchange rate affects (reduces) the price received by exporters and 
producers. By contrast, normally price of manufactured goods are cost determined, so an 
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increase in domestic cost of production is reflected to its export price. As the manufacturing 
exports are highly import intensive, an appreciation of the currency would reduce the cost of 
imported inputs, but at the same time would lead to higher (output) export price thus a 
decline in demand for exports. Nevertheless, many light manufactured goods have become 
“commoditized” and the change in exchange rate affects them the same way it affects 
primary commodities; thus an appreciation of the currency affects the price received by the 
producers putting pressure on the profit margin and return on investment in the 
manufacturing sector. By contrast non-tradable goods are not directly affected by the 
appreciation of the currency; the relative return on investment will change in favour of non-
tradables. Further, the risks in investment in non-tradables are smaller as they do not face 
international competition and their gestation period is usually shorter. In such a situation, 
liberalization of imports puts competitive pressure on domestic production of manufactured 
goods, which are often at early stages of infancy reducing the incentive to invest in this 
sector as compared to non-tradables such as real estates. The demand for non-tradables, 
particularly the real estates increases due to the enhanced income of the bureaucratic class 
and speculative demand as risk of investment in these areas are also lower, compared to 
investment in the manufacturing and agricultural sectors.   All in all, prospects for 
productive activities, particularly non-oil exports will be adversely affected. 
 
III. The development process since the discovery of oil  
Unfortunately, we can not provide empirical evidence for all points made in the analytical 
framework due to the lack of data and information. Nevertheless, an attempt will be made 
to substantiate the main points with the help of available data.  
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 Oil revenues, which were nil in 1998, mounted to over 14 per cent of GDP in the 
same year (table 3). In the absence of oil, contribution of trade to remedying some of the 
physical constraints to growth, outlined above, would have been extremely limited 
because of the limited availability of imports due to the small size of exports, net foreign 
exchange earning from grants and loans, and the debt burden of the country. In 1995, 
before the discovery of oil, total imports and exports of goods and services of the country 
were less tan $1.2 b. (7% of GDP) and $682b (3 % of GDP), respectively. As late as 
2005, total non-oil exports of Sudan was less than $650 million and the non-oil export 
(goods and services)/non-oil GDP ratio was only 3 percent.  
As is shown in table (1) the required investment/GDP ratio to achieve a conservative 
estimate GDP growth rate of 7.9 per cent between 2005 and 2015 is extremely high, 
particularly for the South, compared to the actual investment/GDP ratio of 20 in 2003 for the 
country ( UNCTAD, 2005: table7.3). According to the same table, even if one extent the 
target of poverty reduction by half to 2020, the required investment/GDP still remains very 
high. 
 Since the beginning of exportation of oil in 1999, investment has increased, but 
contribution of oil to current expenditure has been far greater. In fact, the increase in oil 
revenues has been accompanied with increases in investment without much need to increase 
taxes. While the investment/GDP ratio of Sudan increased from about 16.8 in 1999 to over 
23.3 per cent in 2005 (table 2), the share of taxes in GDP increased only by 1.6 percentage 
points from 5.9 to 7.5 (World Bank, 2006.a: Figure 2 and World Bank, 2006.b: table 2). 
Nevertheless, despite the increase in the ratio of oil revenues to GDP, the increase in I/GDP 
ratio was almost entirely due to the increase in FDI (foreign savings), rather than the result 
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of national investment. When FDI is excluded national investment shows hardly any 
increase (tables 2 and 3). The discovery of oil in particular contributed to increase in FDI 
(table 2) and the increase in credit worthiness of the country in the international market. The 
stock of debts of the country increased from $19.4 billions in 1999 to $ 27.7 billions in 
2005; yet as a percentage of GDP declined from 192 to 100 over the same period. Similarly 
the debt service ratio declined from 12.2 to 5.6. (World Bank, 2006.b: table 7.1).  
     Insert tables 2 and 3 here 
 The Government so far has chosen to channel the oil revenues into the economy 
directly through Government budget. The more it is allocated to unproductive activities 
(mostly current expenditures), the less will be available for productive investment. 
Moreover, allocation of financial resources to those activities also deprives productive 
activities scarce real resources such as skilled labour, infrastructure etc. According to table 
3, the increase in oil revenues is almost entirely allocated to increases in current expenditure 
by the Government. Therefore, it is not surprising that domestic investment/GDP ratio has 
not increased after the discovery of oil. 
 The increase in current expenditures is partly understandable as the country is 
engaged in a military conflict. Nevertheless, it is not the whole story.  The Government 
employees were one of the main beneficiaries of the increase in Government current 
expenditure. For example, during 2002-2006, the government salaries and wages increased 
2.5 times, almost equal to the percentage increase in capital expenditure of the Government. 
Over the same period, the incremental percentage ratios of Government wages and salaries 
to GDP (11.4) exceeded the incremental ratio of oil revenues to GDP (9). In 2006, wages 
and salaries accounted for over one fifth of Government expenditure (Based on IMF, 2006: 
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table 2)4. To what extent the increase was the result of an increase in the number of 
government employees, or in unit wages and salaries, is not clear in the absence of data.  
 Although no data are available on the distribution of Government expenditures in 
Khartoum and provinces, it is believed that about 60 to 70 per cent of the budget is spent in 
Khartoum with its impact on the pattern of imports in favour of consumer goods including 
consumer durables (see tables 4 and 5). While the growth of imports of Machinery and 
transport equipments looks impressive, the figure contains imports of passenger cars. For 
example, between 2002 and 2005, for which data are readily available, the share of 
passenger cars, in total imports of transport equipments increased noticeably while that of 
capital equipments declined (table 5).  
    Insert tables 4 and 5 here 
 Serious bottlenecks have already appeared in infrastructure including electricity and 
water supply and transports, and organizational weakness showed themselves, e.g. in port 
facilities5 and transport, leading to delay in inland delivery of goods. Further there have been 
weaknesses in institutions of trade promotion (IMF, 2006: 6). Moreover, inflation has 
picked up to 16.5 per cent at the end of 2006 as compared with 5.6 for the end of 2005 and 
average of 8 per cent for 2006.  
 Weakness in organization and a fire-fighting approach, rather than foresight, often 
leads to waste of resources and dissatisfaction of the stakeholders involved. One example is 
the way the Government handled the bottlenecks in transport services caused by the 
shortages of trucks. After some pressure from the private sector, the Government attempted 
to remove restriction on imports of trucks. As the decision was not based on a careful 
analysis, it subsequently led to significant over capacity of about 30 per cent  in the supply 
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of tucks and the consequent losses for the private sector and inefficient use of foreign 
exchange.   
 There is clear evidence that Sudanese Dinar has appreciated considerably by 17 per 
cent between 1998 and 2005 and another 18 per cent in 2006)6. Significant appreciations of 
the currency no doubt will have a strong detrimental effect on both exports and domestic 
production through its price incentive effects as exporters will earn considerably less and 
producers face competition from cheap imports. As a result, both exporters and producers 
will be “pushed” out of tradable goods. There is in fact, some evidence on such a tendency. 
The non-oil export has increased little since 2000, and in 2005 it was less than its level in 
1995(table A.1). More importantly, exports of manufactured goods, which picked up in the 
second part of 1990s, have drastically declined afterwards (table A.1). On the basis of the 
UN definition of manufactured goods, leather remains the only noticeable exports of 
manufactured goods (see table A.2).  
 Of course, in addition to exchange rate appreciation, the manufacturing sector has 
faced competition from imports due to the significant import liberalization during the last 15 
years (see the following section). Considering the structure of production in the 
manufacturing sector, it is very likely that exports of manufactured goods may disappear 
altogether, perhaps with exception of petroleum based products, if present policies continue. 
Five industries together account for over 85 per cent of manufacturing production (food 
processing and beverages: 55 %; tobacco, 5%, chemical products 4.3%; petroleum based 
products, 17% and motor vehicles assembly operations, 3.6%). With the exception of 
petroleum based products, all are geared to the domestic market; and the vehicle industry 
enjoys significant protection.  
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 Production of traditional industries has not been particularly promising.  Clothing 
and textile are the only other important industries of the country; but they operate with 
extremely low capacity. In fact, the clothing industry has almost vanished (Table 6) under 
the pressure of competition from imports, the lack of modernization, due to the lack of 
resources and incentives. Indeed, half of manufacturing industries for which data are 
available have been working between zero to fifty per cent capacity (see table 6). Low 
capacity utilization of course implies existence of low productivity and high average cost. 
While both currency appreciation and import liberalization may have influenced, inter alia, 
the performance of export and production of the manufacturing sector. The relative impact 
of each is not however clear. There is a need for a detailed study of the issue. 
Insert tables 6 and 7 here 
 The urban investors and industrialists, unlike farmers, have attractive profit 
opportunities outside of manufacturing activities. Non-tradables, e.g, trade related services, 
and construction activities, provide favourable opportunities for them. The annual average 
growth rates of all non-tradables item are higher than those of agriculture and manufacturing 
sectors for the 2000-5 period (see table 7); thus the non-tradables have gained considerable 
shares in GDP since 2000 (Figure 1). “Other services”, shown in the figure, include 
Government services. The figure on construction activities includes infrastructures and 
factory buildings. Data on growth of real estate is not available. Nevertheless, the experience 
of other oil exporting countries would indicate that in Sudan also real estates must have 
expanded fast despite the fact that financing facilities for real estates have not been ample in 
the country. Until 2000, no financing facilities for the sector were available, since then the 
real Estate Bank provides some short-term loans. 
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 Agriculture has suffered from both currency appreciation and import competition. 
Between 1998 and 2005 imports of foodstuffs increased by 2.4 times from $263.7m. to $ 
628m. However, the operation of push and pull factors are somewhat different in the 
agricultural sector than in the manufacturing one. In the short-and medium-terms, farmers 
may resist going out of agriculture despite the decline in their income. First, land is the only 
means of living for them and have little other opportunities in the rural areas. As their 
income is affected negatively, they continue cultivation for a while, but do not make effort 
to put extra resources in land to improve yield. The data on yields are extremely unreliable 
as estimation of area under cultivation and harvest are based on guess-estimates rather than 
scientific methods. Further, changes in yields are severely affected by vagaries of nature 
thus a firm judgement can not be made on changes in yield in the short-to medium-run. 
Nevertheless, the spectacular increase in yield in wheat cultivation, as compared with other 
crops, during recent years is telling and can be attributed to the incentives, cheap finance 
and services provided by Government. During 2000-04, yield, area under production and 
production of wheat increased by 18%, 89% and 120%, respectively. In most other main 
crops, for which data are available, yields declined (EIU, 2006:57). After the food shortage 
of 2001, the government paid more attention to wheat production.  By contrast, low, and in 
some cases declining yields in some other products can be attributed, inter alia, to the lack 
of incentives and shift of resources to wheat production. 
 Another reason for the farmers to delay shifting to other activities is the illusion and 
hope for improvement due to the lack of appreciation of the reasons for changes, the lack of 
opportunities in rural areas and the socio-cultural resistance to a quick migration to cities. 
Nevertheless, after a lag, farmers, particularly the younger ones, will leave villages heading 
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to the cities in search of jobs in the construction activities or informal sector. It is perhaps 
early to witness such a development in a large scale in the case of Sudan. 
  Nevertheless, Sudan would witness in the next decade a significant migration to 
cities and loss of cash crops unless some policies are adopted in favour of Agriculture. After 
all, both Venezuela and Algeria were significant coffee producers and exporters before 
discovering oil, but these produces have been wiped out. Such outcome is not, however, 
inevitable. For example, Indonesia used oil revenues and adopted favourable policies to 
boost production of rice (Shafaeddin, 1988). We understand the Government is considering 
preparation of a “rehabilitation programme” for agriculture.  
 Comprehensive disaggregate data on investment for various sectors are not 
available.  Judged by the available data, shown in table 8, however, the prospects for 
tradable sectors do not seem promising, investors, particularly national ones, favoured 
investment in services. And the agriculture sector, which account for the bulk of GDP, is 
favoured the least. Although the breakdown of investment in the industrial sector is not 
available, it is very likely that the share of manufacturing in total will be small. The data on 
this sector includes investment in mining (including gold which has been the fifth biggest 
item in non-oil exports), utilities and construction. 
 
Insert table 8 here 
 Currency appreciation and trade liberalization are not the only reason for the 
stagnation of non-oil exports. The exporters and producers have also suffered from 
detrimental impacts of other Government policies, particularly those which contributed to 
increasing costs of production and transaction. For example, the manufacturing sector, 
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which requires long-term investment, suffers form high cost of interest, particularly as a 
result of the increase in the cost of borrowing since the introduction of Islamic banking, as 
well as the way interest is calculated by Banks in Sudan. The borrowers pay interest on full 
loans till the end of the contract despite their amortization in the interval. There are 
numerous taxes, charges and fees on, inputs (thus the lack of a decrease in costs of imported 
inputs despite trade liberalization and currency appreciation), production and exports as will 
be mentioned shortly. The allocation of financial resources has also been increasingly 
favourable to local trade, rather than exports, and considerably in favour of “other activities” 
rather than Industry and Agriculture. In 2005 the share of “other activities” was over 31per 
cent of the total flows to all sectors. By contrast, Exports, Industry and agriculture received 
8.2%, 11.9% and 4.9% of the total flow, respectively. In the same year the flow of funds to 
“other activities” increased by nearly 88 per cent, while that to the export activities declined 
by about 26 per cent (Central Bank of Sudan, 2005:91). “Other activities” include energy, 
mining, real estate and some unspecified sectors (Central Bank of Sudan, op. cit.).  
 Agriculture has suffered from declining credit provisions, except for wheat which 
also has enjoyed subsidized credit; as debt-ridden farmers were unable to repay their debts 
the banks cut back on credits (EIU, 2006:39). Extension services were lacking and 
deteriorated due to “the privatization of some services to the collective irrigation projects” 
(loc. cit). After all, both the agricultural and manufacturing sectors were subject to the 
competitive pressure from trade liberalization as will be explained below.  
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IV. Trade Policy 
For Sudan, as an oil exporting country, trade policy takes a much more important role 
than in many non-oil exporting countries for three main reasons. First, due to the 
appreciation of the currency, the foreign exchange loses its importance as an instrument 
of trade and industrial policy. In fact, unlike cases where trade liberalization is partially 
offset by compensatory devaluation, in the case of Sudan one needs to resort to other 
policy instruments, including trade policy, to compensate for the appreciation of the local 
currency. Secondly, main agricultural export and import products of Sudan are subject to 
a high degree of subsidization by main developed country exporters, notably the USA 
and EU with, their negative influence on international prices of these products. Thirdly, 
the country is at early stages of industrialization and trade policy in general should help 
development of its industrial capacity in the long-run, based on the principle of dynamic 
comparative advantage.  
 Therefore, the process of trade policy of the country, including its trade 
liberalization, should be envisaged in this context. In other word, to succeed, trade policy in 
general, including trade liberalization, should be based on a clear long-term strategy. Both 
industrial support and liberalization should be selective and flexible accompanied with 
capacity building for provision of a host of other supplementary measures necessary for 
industrialization and growth. Otherwise, the experience of trade liberalization in other 
developing countries, particularly low income ones, shows that pre-matured and across-the-
board trade liberalization could lead to locking the country in production and exports of 
primary commodities and at best some assembly operations and simple labour intensive 
industries (Shafaeddin 2006.a).  
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 Some effort is being made by the Government authorities to formulate trade policy 
of the country while the country is preparing for the accession to WTO. Nevertheless, Sudan 
is facing two main challenges in organization and design of trade policy making. First it 
needs to design and formulate a long-tem trade strategy integrated into development 
strategy. Second, it needs to remedy fragmentation in policy making in order to: overcome 
the lack of coordination among policy makers involved; avoided inconsistencies between 
trade policy and other government policies; take appropriate supplementary policies and 
measures necessary for industrialization and development.  
 To begin with, the country needs a consistent long-term trade policy integrated into 
development strategy. Currently this is lacking. Tariffs are set by the High Custom 
Committee with the participation of the representatives of the Ministries of Trade, Industry 
and Agriculture. Nevertheless, the Committee functions under the guidance and control of 
the revenue department of the Ministry of Finance. Tariffs serve basically as a fiscal 
instrument, i.e. to raise revenues although its protective function is not ignored entirely.  
 The Government has liberalized the trade regime of the country significantly with 
the introduction of National Economic Salvation Programme in 1990, and the introduction 
of Comprehensive National Plan of 1992-2002. However, tariffs were still high until 1998 
when the Government liberalized the trade regime further with recommendations received 
from IMF in 1997. It seems, however that in the new trade regime, the development 
dimension of tariffs was neglected by the Government. By 2002, the average tariffs rate of 
the country was reduced considerably to 24.3, and the number of import tariff bands and the 
tariff band range were reduced to 47(from 15 in 1989) and 0-40 (from 0-1000 in 1989), 
respectively. Later on in 2002, the highest band was increased to 45 for revenue reasons. In 
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2003 a new band (3) was introduced and the average tariff rate was reduced to 22.7; the 
tariff bands comprised of: 0 (244 lines), 3 (715 lines) 10 (1422 lines), 25 (362 lines) and 45 
(1547lines). Subsequently in 2004 the band 3 was again eliminated, and in 2005 the average 
tariff rate was further reduced to 21.7 per cent.  
 The tariff reform of 2005, in particular, was substantial when 306 tariff lines were 
reduced as follows: 
•  130 tariff lines from 30 percent to 10 per cent (mostly inputs); 
• 116 lines from 25 per cent to 3 per cent (again mostly inputs); 
• 22 lines from 10 per cent to 0 per cent ( machinery and equipments); 
• 16 lines from 45 per cent to 25 per cent (Intermediate goods e.g. cement and iron 
product); 
• 3 lines from 25 per cent to 0 per cent (agricultural products: plants and trees).8 
 The upper tariff band was reduced to 40 in 2006 leading to further reduction in 
average tariffs. Currently the agricultural sector is subject to average simple tariff rate of 31 
per cent and manufacturing 18.4 per cent. However, the import weighted average for all 
products is believed to be 11 percent as many investors are exempted from tariffs for 
imported inputs and machinery under the Investment Encouragement Act. Export duties 
(but not internal taxes and charges) on all export items, except for hide and skin, have been 
removed.  
 The tariff band structure has some elements contributing to protection of infant 
industries. Generally speaking, tariffs on heavy machinery, imported raw materials and 
inputs to manufacturing, agriculture and animal husbandry are zero or low (e.g 10 per cent 
for tools and equipments).  Moreover, the tariff structure seems to benefit from tariff 
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escalation with the degree of processing to promote and protect value added (TRADES, 
2004:36-7).  
 Luxury products are subject to higher tariffs, for revenue purposes, and for saving 
foreign exchange. Similarly, there is a high tariff on sugar, the nominal international price of 
which has been falling continuously (by an annual average rate of over 4 per cent during 
1988-2004 (UNCTAD.2005: table 8.5), influenced by subsidization by developed country 
producer and exporter.  
 The tariff structure, so designed contributes to establishment of various industries, 
based on domestic raw materials and imported inputs and assembly operations in luxury 
goods (cars, TV, refrigerators, etc.). The tariff structure, as well as trade liberalization, does 
not seem to be, however, linked to a clear industrial strategy where specific industries are 
chosen for support and development-except for a few luxury one-such as the car industry 
which also enjoys high tariffs. Even in these cases the high tariff seems to be imposed for 
revenue purposes rather than as an element of industrial strategy.  
 Generally speaking, the reform of the tariff structure does not seem to have been 
based on any research and analysis or on a clear industrial strategy. And the results do not 
seem to have been satisfactory. The liberalization of 1990s, before the oil boom when the 
impact of the Dutch Disease was not present,  was not conducive to growth of 
manufacturing sector as judged by the rate of growth of 2.4 per cent for the sector over 
1990-98 as compared with 3.4 per cent for 1980-90 period9 (World Bank, 2000: table 41.1). 
As mentioned earlier, for the period after the oil boom, although the MVA has picked up, it 
has been accompanied with sever fluctuation and declining exports; moreover, the capacity 
utilization is still low in most industries and the investment in the manufacturing sector, as 
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well as the Agriculture, has not been promising.  Paradoxically, even where some industries 
were subject to relatively high tariff (e.g. clothes and shoes benefited from the highest tariff 
band), they did not performed satisfactory: the first is vanishing as mentioned earlier, and 
the second is operating at 40 per cent capacity-although it is true that these two products are 
subject to sever competition from imports from China. In other words, both liberalization 
and application of high tariffs have failed. Thus, the failure of tariff reform to promote 
exports seems, inter alia, to be also due to some other shortcomings than the trade policy 
making and implementation. We have already mentioned some of these problems in the 
previous section. 
 Another shortcoming of the trade policy mechanism of Sudan is that it is too 
fragmented. Many players are involved with little coordination. In principle, the Ministry of 
Foreign Trade is supposed to be responsible agency for trade policy. Nevertheless, in 
practice, its involvement is minimal. The Ministry of Finance sets tariff, the Ministry of 
Trade is responsible for licensing , the Ministry of Investment provides duty exemptions to 
investors; some other Ministries, e.g. Ministries of Agriculture, Livestock or Industry, set 
various charges and fees ( and even sometimes restrict, or allow, imports) and the Ministry 
of finance imposes taxes; the WTO Accession Commission (WTOAC), which is responsible 
for issues related to the accession, operates independently in the presidential office ; the 
Ministries of  Trade and International Co-operation deals with other multilateral trade 
agreements.  
 Moreover, as a result of the lack of coordination, there are often contradictions 
between trade policy and other Government policies including fiscal measures.  While trade 
liberalization, i.e. reduction in import duties, put competitive pressure on domestic products 
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and reduces bias against exports, a host of other charges and taxes put cost pressure on 
production and offsets the anti-export bias of tariff reductions. Despite the fact that a number 
of taxes and charges (numbered around 50 in 20049)-WT/ACCC/SDN/17) 10have been 
omitted, or reduced, still many of them remain, and sometimes new ones are introduced. In 
some cases taxes and charges account for 20 per cent of cost of production. For example, 
taxes imposed on sugar, which is an important input to the food processing and biscuit 
industry constitute 34.8 per cent of the factory gate price. Apart from increases in production 
cost, the contradictory measures taken by various players lead to unpredictability and 
uncertainty of investors. The fluctuation in growth of MVA could be partly attributed to this 
issue.  
 Finally, trade policy on its own can not make miracles. Trade policy has not been 
backed by other measures necessary for diversification of the production and export 
structure. For example, the lack of attention to development of marketing and distribution 
channels is also a contributing factor to high market prices, particularly for such agricultural 
products as live stocks and sesame. A World Bank DTSI study on Agricultural sector 
concluded that the margin of taxes and marketing costs together add about 100 per cent to 
farm gate price of cattle in Dafur before reaching Omdurman market.  
VI . Some suggestions on  
trade policy structure and challenges of policy making 
Achieving the level of an advanced economy is an objective of the Government as 
mentioned earlier. To achieve this objective, requires moving up the ladder of 
industrialization by continuous upgrading of the industrial structure. The design and 
structure of trade policy should, therefore, serve this long-term objective. Unless this 
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“challenge” is faced appropriately, the country will continue specializing in oil and other 
primary commodities. In an ideal situation, free of external pressure and obligations 
imposed by WTO, the structure of tariffs should be flexible, mixed, dynamic and predictable 
accompanied with a long-term industrial strategy. It should be flexible because at any point 
in time different industries need different degree of support, or liberalization. It should be 
dynamic because over time tariffs are raised on some products and reduced on others until 
the industrial sector is built-up and all restrictions on trade are removed. Such a dynamic 
tariff structure also has implications for negotiation in WTO on binding tariffs.  
 The scarcity of resources, both financial and skilled human resources; the lack of 
experience; the existence of market failure; different externalities, linkages and learning 
effects –all imply that the country cannot develop various industries at the same time. The 
experience of industrialized countries show that industrialization proceeds on selective basis. 
The country may choose some light industries to begin with. As a group of industries are 
selected for development, the inputs for these industries should be free of duties, if imported, 
or free of taxes and charges if domestically produced. Nevertheless, the experience of 
developing countries shows that to avoid rent seeking and inefficiencies, any support 
provided to an industry should be accompanied with “performance requirement” 
(Amsden,1989 and Shafaeddin, 2006.b). The enterprises should also know in advance that 
the support would be temporary. Pressure should be put on the enterprises first through 
domestic competition and then by gradual removal of tariffs and other supports as the 
industry reaches near the stage of maturity. At this stage all measures should be taken to 
back-up the firms concerned to enter quickly into the international market. Provision of 
information on market and marketing channels is essential for this purpose. The WTO rules 
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do provide some policy space for subsidization of exports in the case of LDCs (Rodrik, 
2004). As these industries become subject to liberalization, a second group are chosen, again 
on selective basis, for development. This group may include some other consumer industries 
and/or input to some of industries in the first group. As the second group matures, the 
process of, liberalization/industrial support etc. continues until some machinery can be 
produced in the country11.  
 Table 9 provides the evolution of a hypothetical dynamic and flexible tariff structure 
for the purpose of illustration. Accordingly, in each phase of industrialization, some 
industries are supported and others benefit from free trade; any support would be temporary 
and liberalization should be gradual. Such a flexible tariff structure should be based on an 
industrial policy. One feature of this tariff structure is that although the tariffs change for 
each group of products over time, the average tariffs is not necessary high; in each phase 
some industries enjoy relatively high tariffs, while others are subject to zero or low tariffs.  
Insert table 9 here 
 It is often argued by neo-liberals that the low capacity of the government for policy 
making and implementation in low income countries would be an impediment to selective 
industrial development; it would not be easy for the government to implement such a 
strategy. Further, as a host of other infrastructural, organizational and institutional factors 
impede industrial development, and trade policy alone can not lead to industrialization (e.g. 
Krueger, 1980). Neither of these arguments are necessary valid. The lack of ease and 
government capacity is not an argument in favour of lethargy; what is needed is to develop 
the capabilities of the government. It is true that a host of other policies and measures are 
essential for industrial development, but this is not an argument for the lack of a flexible 
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trade policy. In fact, when an industry is supposed to be developed in an unfavourable 
environment, the environment, including market failure, should be corrected and at the same 
time the industry be provided with support. After all, the results of empirical analysis are not 
conclusive in favour of a rigid tariff structure and uniform trade liberalization (Shafaeddin, 
2005.a, Stiglitz, 2005, Rodrik, 1997)12. 
 The flexible tariff structure proposed above has an important implication for the way 
tariffs are bound. If individual tariff lines are bound at a low rate, the country will lose 
flexibility of trade policy as a tool of industrialization and development. If on the other hand, 
the average tariffs, not individual tariff lines, are bound, the country could benefit from the 
flexibility in its tariff structure on the line proposed above.  
 In fact, in the above illustrative example, the average bound tariffs necessary for 
achieving the proposed flexible tariff structure is 25 which is less than the case where 
sectoral tariffs rates are bound. In other words, in the latter case, if the country is at phase I, 
it has “to bind its sectoral tariffs at the maximum rates, ending up with an average bound 
tariff of 37.5 per cent [(20+40+50+40)/4. If it is in phase II the necessary average bound rate 
would be (10+40+50+40)/4=3513 ]” (Akuze, 2006:26-7). 
 In practice, negotiating such a tariff structure in WTO is an important challenge. In 
spite of the fact that the WTO rules provides some leeway for LDCs (Rodrik, 2004), the 
experience of other acceding countries would indicate that Sudan will also be under the 
pressure to accept “WTO plus” conditions. It may come under the pressure to opt for more 
uniform tariff rates, to reduce applied tariffs, and to bind tariffs at the reduced applied rate. 
To what extent the country would succeed would depend not only on the skill of negotiation 
but also on the beliefs and stands of the Sudanese negotiators regarding the type of trade 
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policy needed for the country.  There are a few points in favour of resisting binding all 
tariffs, particularly at low rates. First, the July package, confirmed in the Honk Kong 
meeting, exempts LDCs from binding tariffs-although the July package refers to the 
contracting parties not acceding countries. Second, currently, for LDCs, the difference 
between bound tariffs and applied tariffs is large as compared with other developing and 
developed countries. For LDCs, the averages are 46.3% and 12.6%; for other developing 
countries they are 29% and 11.1 per cent and for developed countries they are 5.7% and 
4.7%, respectively. (Page &Kleen, 2004:34). Similarly, LDCs also benefit from tariff 
escalation more than other developing countries (loc. cit). Third, other acceding countries 
were made obliged to bind some tariff lines, not all. Fourth, the Doha Round and subsequent 
Sub Committee on Least Developed Countries (see e.g.WTO:  WT/COMITD/LDC/11-
2002), recommended facilitation of the accession of LDCs-although did not specifically 
refer to the issue of binding. Finally, the on going negotiation on the question of the choice 
of coefficient, under the Swiss Formula, under NAMA officially exempts LDCs from 
binding their tariffs.  
 Yet, the country may not be able to avoid binding some tariffs. Hence, it should be 
well prepared in advance to know which tariff lines it is ready to bind and which ones it 
should avoid. Such a preparation would require a long-term trade and industrial policy. 
Sudan should also be alert that the tariff lines it binds would not conflict with its current, or 
future, commitments under regional trade agreements. In other word, it does not bind those 
tariff lines below those, e.g. agreed, or to be agreed, tariff lines under COMESA. Another 
challenge for Sudan is to avoid “WTO plus” conditions under EPA (Economic Partnership 
Agreement) under pressure from EU. This issue requires a separate paper.  
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VII. Conclusions 
We have attempted to analyse the impact of discovery of oil on economic development of 
Sudan, as a low income country, and the prospects for its long-run development and 
diversification of its production and export structure. Developing a framework of analysis 
we have shown that while rapid and sustained development and diversification are among 
long-run objectives of the Government and oil can contribute to achieving theses objectives 
through its “financial effects” and “supply effects”. Whether or not it does, will depend, we 
have argued, on the Government policies and the way oil revenues are allocated. In fact, the 
contribution of the oil sector to development and diversification will be hampered by some 
physical, institutional and organizational factors including the socio-economic impact of the 
oil sector itself on the economy as well as the attitude of the Government. We have shown 
that acceleration of GDP growth of Sudan has become possible since the discovery of oil 
without much increase in taxes and domestic savings. The increase in the I/GDP ratio of the 
country was, however, almost entirely due to increases in FDI and credit worthiness of the 
country in international market. Otherwise, the increase in oil revenues has almost entirely 
been allocated to current expenditures by the Government. The Government employees 
have been the main beneficiaries. For example, during 2002-6 the incremental percentage 
ratio of wages and salaries, received by Government employees, to GDP exceeded the 
incremental ratio of oil revenues to GDP. Growth and diversification were also faced with 
such bottleneck as shortage of electricity, water, transport facilities as well as organizational 
factors. The non-oil exports have increased little since 2000 and in 2005 they were lower 
than their level in 1995. Manufacturing export, in fact, declined. It declined not only due to 
the so-called Dutch disease and import liberalization, but also because of the inconsistent 
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Government policies which contributed to increasing cost of production. They together 
reduced incentive for investment in production and exports activities in agriculture and 
manufacturing sectors as compared with non-tradable activities.  
 We have argued that in Sudan, as an oil exporting country, long-term trade policy 
strategy more importance than in other developing countries. Yet the existence of oil 
revenues itself reduces the need for formulating an appropriate strategy. We have reviewed 
the process of trade liberalization of the country which started in early 1990s and showed 
that the trade policy of the country is not geared to a well-thought and clear industrial 
strategy. The tariff system of the country functions basically as a tool of fiscal measures 
rather than a tool of industrial policy. Not only the trade policy making is fragmented, but 
also there are inconsistencies between trade policy and other policies and measures taken by 
the Government.  
 We have also proposed a dynamic and flexible long-term trade and industrial 
policies for the country. We have, however, added that implementing such a policy is a 
challenge for the Government despite the fact that the WTO rules envisage some flexibility 
for LDCs. It is a challenge, because of the limitations which may be imposed on the country 
in the process of negotiation for the accession to WTO. In order to prepare for facing that 
challenge there is a need for formulating comprehensive long-term trade and industrial 
policies integrated into the development strategy of the country-let alone the need for the 
knowledge, information and skill of bargaining. The problem is that the availability of oil 
revenues reduces the urgent need for such a strategy. As long as oil revenues are available 
such a need will not be felt; when oil revenues exhaust, it will be too late. This is the main 
dilemma of an oil exporting country.  
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Table 1: Required growth rates of GDP and I/GDP ratio for reducing poverty by half 
starting (2005) 
 
     All Sudan North   South  
     ----------------------------------------------- 
By 2015: 
GDP (An. Av. Growth rate)  7.9  6.8  31 
I/GDP ratio    34.2  24.6  227.1 
By 2020: 
GDP (An. Av. Growth rate)  6.2  5.5  21.3 
I/GDP ratio    26.4  19.9  157 
Source: Abdel Gadir Ali (2006): 145-7 
 
 
 
Table 2: Investment, savings and FDI as a ratio of GDP 
(Sudan 1999-2005) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  FDI S I  (I-S) FDI I-FDI  
Year  $m -------------------------------------------- 
     % of GDP  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1) 1999 223 7.7 16.8 9.1 2.1 14.7   
2) 2005 2355 13.3 23.3 10.0 8.5 14.8   
Changes: 2-1 2132 5.6 6.5 0.9 6.4 0.1   
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Sources: Based on IMF (2006.a:table2) and World Bank (2006.b: tables 3, and 6)  
 
Note: The figures on FDI also include portfolio investment. 
 
 
Table 3: Oil revenues and Government current expenditure as a  
  Percentage of GDP (Sudan, 1999-2005) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Year   Oil revenues  Current expenditures 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1)  1999   0.6    7.2 
2)  2005   14.3    20.6 
 Changes: 2-1   13.7    13.4 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Sources: Based on World Bank (2006.a table 2 and 2006.b: table 4) 
  
Note: the figures on FDI also include portfolio investment. 
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Table 4: Main groups of imports of Sudan in 1998 and 2005 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     1998 2005 Ratio  An.Av. 
     (1) (2) (2) :(1)  Growth rate 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Total imports: of which:  1664 5946 3.57  19.9 
Foods     264 628 2.37  13.2 
Light Manufactured goodsb  625.2 1261 2.01    10.5 
Machinery and transport equipments 482a 2417 5.01  35.9 
 
Sources: World Bank (2006.b:19-20 and 2006.a table 3) which in turn is 
Based on IMF sources for Balance of Payments Accounts. 
 
a: The figure relates to year 2000 
b: Excludes textiles 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Share of main items in imports of transport equipments of Sudan (2002-5) 
 
 Year  Passenger cars &parts   Busses, truck & Railway equipment 
   Value ($m)   Share (%)  Value ($m) Share (%) 
 2002  91.7  35.8   97.6  38.2 
 2005  475.2  41.3   360.6  31.3 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Based on Central Bank of Sudan (2005: table XVI-B). 
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Table 6: Capacity utilization ratio in some industries of Sudan in 2005 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Industry   %  Industry   % 
 
Sugar     108.5  Leather   50.0 
Printing   75.0  Refrigerators   49.5 
Juice    80.0  Liquid battery cells  42.5 
Matches   77.8  Paints    40.0 
Soft drinks   72.0  Shoes    40.0 
Confectioneries  70.0  Flour miles   39.0 
Biscuits   66.7  Vegetable oils   25.0 
Pharmaceutique (average): 66.7  Textiles   8.3 
Dry battery cells  66.7  Yarn    14.0  
Jam    54  Ready made clothes  0.0a 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Central Bank of Sudan (2005:52-8 
a. 7.7 in 2004 
 
 
Table 7: Annual average growth rates of main non-oil sectors of Sudan (2000-5) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Sectors       Growth rates 
     1980-90 1990-98 1999-2005 2000-5 
 
Agriculture    0.6  15.3  2.5  2.8  
Manufacturing    3.4  2.4  4.2  4.7  
Transport and communication      5.3  5.4 
Trade, restaurant and hotels      7.2  8.25 
Construction        3.8  7.3 
…  
Other services (including public sector)     7.7 
 8.2 
All services    1.7  3.0      
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: based on World Bank (2006.b: table 2) which is in turn is based on IMF sources 
except those of 1900-98 which are based on World Bank (2000: table 4.1). 
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Table 8: Investment in various economic sectors of Sudan (total 2000-4) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       National Foreign   Total  Share of  
Sector  Value   % Value % Value % national (%) 
                        ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Industry 3921 38.1 764 48.3 5687 41 68.9 
Services 6222 60.5 653 65.3 7878 56 78.9 
Agriculture 131 1.3 230 6.3 361 3 36.2 
Total   10276 100 3650 100 13926 100 73.8 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Ministry of Industry of Sudan 
 
 
 
Table 9: Hypothetical evolution of average tariffs for various groups of 
Industries at different phases of industrialization 
 
Phase RB&LI LT MT HT Manufactures 
(Average) 
I 20 0 0 0 5 
II 10 40 0 0 12.5 
III 0 30 50 0 12.5 
IV 0 20 40 40 25 
V 0 10 30 40 20 
VI 0 0 15 25 10 
VII 0 0 5 15 5 
VII 0 0 0 0 0 
Source: Akyuz (2005: 27) 
 
Notations: 
RB: Resource-based industries 
LI: Labour -intensive industries 
LT: Low-technology-intensive industries 
MT: Medium technology-intensive industries 
HT: High technology-intensive industries 
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Figure 1: Value-added of non-boom tradable and non-tradable as % of GDP 
 
Evolution of the relative size of the boom and nonboom tradables and nontradables 
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Source: World Bank (2006.a:11). 
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Table A.1: The Structure of Sudan’s Exports (1995-2005) 
   Value  ($m.)   Share in Non-oil X (%) 
   -------------------------------------  ------------------------------------- 
Export groups  1995 2000 2003 2005  1995 2000 2003 2005 
Total    685 1631 2481 4355  100.3 300.4 485.5 714.3 
Oil   2.1 1088 1970 3745  0.3 200.4 385.5 614.2 
Non-oil, of which: 685 543 511 609.7  100 100 100 100 
Agriculture  613 348 395 505  89.7 64.1 77.2 82.8 
Food  297 271 246 296  43.5 49.9 48.1 48.5 
Ag. Raw materials 316 77 149 209  46.2 14.2 29.1 34.2 
Manufactured goods 43 124 37 4.4  6.3 22.8 7.3 0.7 
Ores and metals* 2.7 8.2 9.9 17.4  0.4 1.5 1.9 2.9 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Sources: Based on UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics (2005and 2006-7): table 4.1.A and 3.1, 
respectively. 
* Excludes gold 
 
 
Table A.2: Main exports of manufactured and semi-processed goods 
   of Sudan in 2003($1000) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
SITC Product    Export 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
611 Leather    29900 
582 Plastic products   74.0 
Semi-processed: 
342 Liquid propane, butane  15594 
571 Polymers of ethylene   5717 
122 Tobacco, manufactured  91.0 
675 other plastic, raw   2437 
 
Others (including re-export): 
282 Ferrous waste and scrape  5161 
288 Non-ferrous waste & scrape  3844 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: UN, COMTRADE database 
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1
 According to one estimate, the proven reserves of oil are about 600 to 800 m. barrels (Economist 
Intelligent Unit, 2006:43-4 and www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Sudan). However, the estimate of recoverable 
reserves range between 2.5 to 5 bn barrels according to the same sources; the IMF Article IV gives an 
estimate of to 10 to 15 bn barrels. If one assumes that that annual output will not exceed that of 2006, 
which is estimated to be about 210 m/bs  (575 000 b/d), the life of proven reserves would be very short-
about 4 years. However, the Government expects production of 1.15m b/d in 2010 (Economist Intelligent 
Unit, Ibid). In such a case the life of the reserves would be even shorter. Nevertheless, on the basis of the 
estimates of probable reserve, their life could be extended to over 20 to 68 years, if current production level 
is maintained or up to 35 years if it is increased to 1.15 m b/d. 
 
  
2
 This section is formulated and developed mainly on the basis of various writings of M. Kalecki 
   (see the references) and the earlier work of the author (1980 and 2003).  
 
  
3
 By contrast, demand determined industries are supply elastic, their output can be increased in the short  
and medium run considerably more easily than that of the supply-determined industries.  
 
4
 The figure for 2006 are estimates 
 
5
 According to the World Bank the delays reaches 83 days; the estimate by the Federation of Chambers of 
commerce is 53 days). Even if one assumes an average of 30 days delays, it would imply a delay of a 
month for the total imports of the country ($6.8b.in 2005) to reach its destination. The direct cost, in terms 
of cost of foreign exchange locked in and the interest rate paid for financing imports, for such a long period 
is considerable let alone its indirect cost in terms of disruption of production and supplies. A more efficient 
organizational arrangement could reduce the number of days at least by 50 per cent.  
 
6
 Based on Central Bank of Sudan sources 
 
7
 In 2002, the number of tariff bands, which had been reduced to 4,were increase to 5 temporarily. 
 
8
  WTO document: WT/ACC/SDN/20:5). 
9
 The annual average growth rate increases to 5.1 for the period 1978-91 (Based on UNDP, 2005: table 2.2. 
 
10
 WTO, document: WT/ACCC/SDN/17). 
 
11
 See Shafaeddin, (2005.b) for details and an example. 
 
12
 For other references and different results and views see Shafaeddin (2006.b). 
 
13
 Only at phase IV, the average necessary bound tariffs would be equal (25) in the two cases. 
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